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Abstract According to Karl Weick, a distinguished scholar in Organizational Behavior and
Psychology, the organization cannot be imagined as an architectural design, static and prescriptive,
but should be described as a Jazz improvisation, a flexible mental model. By conceiving both the
organization and its environment as a social and mental construct, we are able to get a better view
on the denotation of the individual factor. In his approach the dichotomy between theory and
practice dissolves. The organization is studied as an activity. These dynamics (dis)continuously
generate sense. Because of his radical choice for understanding the organization as dynamic and
without ground, his thinking has parallels with post-modern thinking. In his description of the
characteristics of organizations, he identifies as sixth element, ongoing. This concept is only
conceivable in its disturbance, its interruption. Herein we sense affinity with the post modern
deconstruction concept (Derrida). With interruption, aspects like misunderstanding, failure, mis-
takes, conflict, contradiction and exclusion get a role in understanding the organization dynamic.
In order to manage the resulting confusion, individuals, in social interaction, actively make sense
of that experience retrospectively. In organizations, managers and employees alike, are essential in
signaling interruptions and the contribution to the process of sensemaking. Managers are expected
to take the initiative in facilitating the open space in which judgment is temporarily suspended.
Managing becomes the managing of sense, sharing of meaning, of diversity and oppositions.
Keywords Sensemaking . Interruption .Meaning . Dis-organising
Introduction
What is an organisation? Is it a building, a name, a brand, a production-unit, a sole proprie-
torship, a group of people? Can we call the internet, Facebook or modern networks
‘organisations’?
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About 150 years after the introduction of organisational theory, not only organisational
practice has changed drastically, but moreover, the theoretical reflections on what an organi-
sation actually is, are more and more apart. Where the organisation was a result of ‘calculative
thought’1 at first – engineers who, based on logical/rational reasoning, drew a production
process and established it on a defined location – now it seems as if nearly any activity can be
labelled with the word ‘organisation’.
We can think of numerous causes to explain these changes, both in theory as in practice.
The visibility of the human factor in ‘organising’ from the 1930s for instance, or the rise of
globalisation after WWII, the unstoppable technological innovation since the 1960s, the
anticipation on environmental effects of industrial activities starting mid-1970s or the financial
instability and stagnation since 2008. There are enough reasons to re-think production
processes, to re-locate production units, to make new legislation and transform old industries
to high tech multi stakeholder networks. Reasons to take action are usually short-term
reactions to external change. The initial premise on which organisations are built – the
conviction that the organisation can be manufactured – is still dominant, while the practice
of organising shows us a different reality.
Organisational psychologist Karl Weick, a distinguished scholar in organisational behav-
iour and psychology, is one of the few organisational theorists of the last century to approach
the organisation starting with a fundamental question which contains all elements of human
action and its complex effects: How can I know what I think until I see(hear) what I do? We
think that this is a philosophical question, where poeisis and praxis apparently come together
in personal judgment. Because Weick distances himself from a static organisational concept
which is mostly concerned with structure, hierarchy and the division of tasks and responsibil-
ities, he creates the opportunity to understand modern dynamic, constantly regenerating
communicative networks as organisation. With a critical understanding of organisations, the
relationship between the organisation and the individual act can also be expanded and the
question about the role of the organisation in the world today can be asked in a different way.
In this essay, we will take a closer look at the starting question from Weick’s organisational
theory by using some of his core concepts. Although it clearly appears that his conceptions can
explicitly be linked to the German modern and French postmodern thought, Weick only sporad-
ically refers to philosophy. We want to compensate this ‘lacking’ at some points in this article.
First we will introduce his organisational perspective: how Weick describes the shell of an
organisation enables his specific approach ofthe (organisational) act. Subsequently we will
contextualise his concept of sensemaking bringing in some philosophical insights, something
Weick hardly did himself.
Notions
Organising = dis-organising?
Weick defines an organisation as organising. He confirms that the organisation cannot be
imagined as an architectural design, static and prescriptive, but should be described as a
flexible mental model wherein the dichotomy between theory and practice dissolves.
1 German philosopher Martin Heidegger opposes calculative thinking to essential thinking. See also ‘Calculative
Thinking and Essential Thinking in Heidegger’s phenomenology’ by John D. Haynes.
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The recipe for disorganization reads: Thrust people into unfamiliar roles, leave some key
roles unfilled, make the task more ambiguous, discredit the role system, and make all
these changes in a context in which small events can combine into something mon-
strous. Faced with similar conditions, organizations that seem much sturdier may also
come crashing down, much like Icarus who overreached his competence as he flew
toward the sun and also perished because of fire (Daft and Weick 2001: 109–110).
Weick comes to this description of dis-organisation by re-writing the classical notion of
organisations.2 In Organisational Redesign as Improvisation, Weick counters the metaphor in
which the organisation is represented as an architectural design. The order that originates in
jazz, a musical improvisation, is made by the musicians and comes into being in a stream of
common experiences. That order is the orchestra and only exists in the heads of the members
of the orchestra (Weick 2001: 201). That is howWeick understands the reality of organisations.
A reality that is stable and unstable, ambiguous and unambiguous at the same time, in short:
the idea of the organisation as a mental construction which is made by individuals and merely
exists ‘in their heads’. A notion of THE organisation does not exist outside the process that
generates this concept. Parts of that stream of experiences are even indescribable and incom-
prehensible (Weick 1979: 12). Therefore, if we want to gain insight into what ‘the organisa-
tion’ could mean, we need to look at the origin itself of the concept in an acting and
communicative de-sign, a circularity of creation of meaning which has neither a beginning,
nor an end. With the translation de-sign we want to stipulate the simultaneously creative,
constructive and disconnecting or decoupling effect of organising. De-sign expresses the un-
signing, the disconnection of the sign character, the referential character. After all, there is
nothing it can refer to except for its own construction. A design is not constructed at a single
point of time but is continuously reconstructed because of unplanned changes, personal
interpretations of facts and the transient character of designs.
In the following scheme, we can see Weick’s vision on the organisation (right column) in a
reaction to the CODE study of Khandwalla (1977) (left column), who proposes the organisa-
tion as an architectural design (Table 1):
This exercise shows us that Weick discards the traditional design of an organisation of its
presupposed static, prescriptive way of operating, and presents it as a flexible conceptual model.
If designs originate in ideas, interaction, shifting competencies, and retrospect, then
organizations should be characterized by a succession of short-lived designs that evap-
orate rather than erode. Designs disappear abruptly rather than fade because they are
competence-specific. As competence changes, so too does design (Weick 2001: 85–86).
In this exercise, he prioritises organisational practices, the act. As a consequence,
the modernist paradigm which is the foundation of classical organisational thinking,
transforms. In short, according to Weick: BTo design is to notice sequences of action
that are improvements, call attention to them, label them, repeat them, disseminate
them, and legitimize them (Weick 2001: 88)^.
2 Cfr. Jean-François Lyotard: ‘Re-ecrire la modernité’, the creation of a new discourse – in spite itself – namely
that of postmodernity. As a philosopher, Lyotard has not identified with – but also not extremely opposed against
- the postmodern discourse. By continuously confronting himself with the question : BHow can I know what I
think until I see what I do^, we see a similar detachment from existing or projected discourses with Weick, Bthat
phrase has haunted me most of my professional life (…) and can be seen as a recipe for organizing and
sensemaking…^ (Making Sense of an Organization) p.95.
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By conceiving both the organisation and its environment as a social and mental construct,
we are also able to get a better view on the denotation of the individual factor. A dynamic
understanding of the organisation puts organising as ‘acting’ up front and incorporates the
interaction with the environment in its own understanding. This implies the continuous
appearance of incoherencies and inconsistencies. For Weick, an organisation ‘lives’ in an
environment where living and working go equally together.
Table 1 This table shows the Khandwalla perspective on an organisation as an architectural design on the left
with the opposite perspective of Weick – the organisation seen as an improvisation – on the right
Architecture Improvisation
Implied assumptions Alternative assumptions
The design of an organisation determines
A design is a blueprint
A design is constructed at a single point in time
Design produce order through intention
Design creates planned change
A design is a recipe
Designing is continuously reconstructed
Design produce order through attention
Design codifies unplanned change after the fact
The design of an organization determines the distribution of resources, authority and information
An organization has only a single design
The design determines the distribution of resources
Designs are large structures that are stabilized
An organization has multiple designs
The distribution of resources determines the design
Designs are small structures that are amplified.
Design’ impacts the ability of the individual manager’
Design affects managerial ability
Managerial action is individual
Managerial ability affects design
Managerial action is social
Designs affect ‘the ability to make and implement’ ‘timely… sound and… acceptable decisions’
Decisions determine effectiveness
The purpose of design is to facilitate decision making
People decide and then they act
Interpretations determine effectiveness
The purpose of design is to facilitate interpretations
People act and then they interpret
Manager’s ability to coordinate and control the activities of subordinates
Controlis differentially distributed
People impose controls
Activities are the object of control
Control is equally distributed
Ideas impose controls
Ideas are the object of control
Proper organizational design can therefore make the difference between having an effective, well-run
organization and one having recurrent crises and organizational inefficiencies
An effective organization has few crises and
inefficiencies
Recurrent crises and inefficiency reduce current
effectiveness
Proper organisational design reduces current
inefficiency
An effective organization has many crises and
inefficiencies
Recurrent crises and inefficiency increase future
effectiveness
Proper organisational design exploits crises and
inefficiencies
Organizational environments are changing… rapidly… {which} erodes
{the effectiveness of an organizational design} over time
Environments change more rapidly than do
organizations
Designs construct organizations to fit environments
Designs are relatively permanent
Organizations change more rapidly than do
environments
Designs construct environments to fit organizations
Designs are relatively transient
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Officially, Weick’s theory is often classified under social constructivism, the theory which
assumes that the world does not occur to us as a fixed given and can only be known in its
‘groundlessness’.3 His radical choice for understanding the organisation as dynamic and
without ground, shows parallels with post-modern thinking, although Weick himself doesn’t
make this connection (Langenberg 2008: 114–118; Langenberg 2011: 103–104). Paradoxical-
ly, in his description of an organisation as a de-sign ‘continuously re-constructed’ we sense
affinity with the post-modern concept of deconstruction, first described by the French philos-
opher Jacques Derrida.4
Each time that I say ‘deconstruction and X (regardless of the concept or the theme),’ this
is the prelude to a very singular division that turns this X into, or rather makes appear in
this X, an impossibility that becomes its proper and sole possibility, with the result that
between the X as possible and the ‘same’ X as impossible, there is nothing but a relation
of homonymy, a relation for which we have to provide an account…. For example, here
referring myself to demonstrations I have already attempted…, gift, hospitality, death itself
(and therefore so many other things) can be possible only as impossible, as the impossible,
that is, unconditionally (Mallet and Michaud 2004: 21–34 ; Derrida 1972 : 56–57).
The groundlessness of an organisation exists in its endless urge desperately looking for
grounds. This never ending dynamic as such creates ambiguity. In order to grasp reality, it is
not the opposition but the inclusion of two counter positions we need to think of. With the
name deconstruction (a combination of destruction and construction) Derrida dissociates
himself from modern thinking: the deconstructive ‘reading’ of reality is never final, it opens
‘ongoing’ new perspectives and meanings and simultaneously elicits its contradictions.
With the concept of deconstruction, Derrida builds on analyses of the German philosopher
Martin Heidegger. Therefore, we shall clarify the notion of ‘groundlessness’ according to
Heideggers notion of ‘the essence of ground’. In Der satzvomGrund, Heidegger writes about
the word for principle (Satz)as a saying, as Andenkend - Vordenkender, as a jump, a musical
sentence (tone, composition). For him, ‘jump’ also refers to the possibility to see the take-off,
the onset of the jump, in retrospect. Heidegger points out that ‘the jump’ (der Satz) (Heidegger
1996: 9) leaves the outlet, and at the same time regains what it leaves behind, andenkend, so
the former possibilities become only now inalienable. He furthermore says:
That into which the leap anticipatorily leaps is not some region of things present at hand
into which one can simply step. Rather, it is the realm of what first approaches as worthy
of thought (Heidegger 1996: 89).
As we will see further on in this essay, it is not difficult to see a relation between the quote
above and what Weick understands with retrospective sensemaking. It is a different way of
formulating Weick’s well-known sentence. This sentence also points at the andenkend which
becomes possible because of the jump. In Weick’s words, we can understand ‘jump’ as
‘interruption’. It also is not a given new terrain which we can enter no matter what, it is an
area which only becomes possible because of the jump, and also gives us an insight into where
3 Sensemaking in Organizations, p. 38. Weick cites Varela et al. Bgroundlessness is the very condition for the
richly textured and interdependent world of human experience…. The world is not pregiven but continually
shaped by the types of actions in which we engage^.
4 Weick dissociates himself from postmodernist thought with a very brief and cryptic argumentation at (1995: 37)
although we see several clear parallels between his theoretical premises and those explored by postmodernists as
Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard.
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we come from. The ‘immediate sense’ as Weick calls it, is the starting point of the
sensemaking process, a previously established sense. Its track remains present as track.
What we can also read is the perspectivist character of the jump, the fact that it makes a new
area, it ‘thinks ahead’. Here it becomes clear that the criticism of the supposed ‘not being
future-oriented’ of Weick’s sensemaking can be countered by referring to Heidegger’s Satz.
Sensemaking, the jump, opens up a new terrain. It carries the ‘mark’ of former possibilities as
Heidegger says, and Weick will agree because he takes ‘experience’ and the above mentioned
‘immediate sense’ as the key-point of the sensemaking-process. It certainly is a jump. That is
why organisational dynamics (dis)continuously generate sense.
When Heidegger speaks of the ‘change of the tone’ (the German word Satz means besides
‘jump’ also ‘tone’ and ‘composition’) and consequently of a change of meaning, or the opening
up of new meanings, we also conceive it in a musical sense (keeping in mind the jazz metaphor
of Weick). With regard to this theme, Heidegger refers to Bettina von Arnim, who writes:
If one speaks of a movement [Satz] in music and how it is performed, or of the
accompaniment of an instrument and of the understanding with which it is treated, then
I mean precisely the opposite, namely that the movement leads the musician, that the
movement occurs, develops and is concentrated often enough till the spirit has complete-
ly joined itself to it (Heidegger 1996: 89).
Sensemaking
Sensemaking is a pivotal concept for Weick. Firstly, because he regards organisations as
‘sharing of meaning’, and secondly because sensemaking is the foundation of the dynamic that
determines the survival of organisations. By taking (organisational) practices as a starting
point, various different theoretical concepts are involved in interpreting and solving problems.
On a theoretical level, assumptions can conflict with each other, but these discrepancies are
subordinate to B(…) sensemaking as an activity which by virtue of constructing, filtering,
framing, create facticity and render ‘the subjective’ into something more tangible (1995: 14)^.
Weick (1995: 55) formulates the process from de-sign to sense as follows:
Once people begin to act (enactment) they generate tangible outcomes (cues) in some
context (social) and this helps them discover (retrospect) what is occurring (ongoing)
what needs to be explained (plausibility) and what should be done next (identity
enhancement) (…) Sensemaking starts with three elements – a frame, a cue, and a
connection – with frames tending to be past moments of socialisation and cues tending
to be present moments of experience (1995: 111)’.
Acting creates retrospect, enactment equal to sense which is being constructed again and
again in the development of the event. Weick indicated that it is incorrect to speak in terms of
‘result’ of the sensemaking-process, because this would ignore the continuity of that
process:Bthere is no result of process but only a moment in process.^ The basis of the
sensemaking-process, ‘a frame’, is built on an ‘immediate sense’, a temporary position which
is taken from the past. This simplified, ordering reading of events, leads to more effective
future action. The frame is also a construction which has been brought about retrospectively
and therefore concerns a processed experience.
Sensemaking is a constructing process of awareness which results in Ba developing set of
ideas with explanatory possibilities^. The latter should not be understood as ‘a body of
226 Philosophy of Management (2016) 15:221–240
knowledge’ however, according to Weick. Rather, these are possibilities of clarification that
have to be brought about over and over. Weick endorses Cohen, March and Olson’s provoc-
ative notion that ‘rationality is in the eye of the beholder’. They formulate it as follows:
(…) an organisation is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings
looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues
to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work (1979: 2).
Weick gives the impression that he turns his back on a rational approach of the organisation.
He does, however, look for ways to make the organisational dynamic understandable and
tangible. This is why he questions concepts such as ‘surrounding’, ‘goal’, ‘continuity’,
‘leadership’, ‘planning’ and ‘rationality’. According to Weick the idea of a stable world is a
Carthesian errancy, but he neither wants to fall into the pitfall of idealism, nihilism or some sort
of subjectivism. In his words we are clearly dealing with a fear that there is no stable world out
there.5
Nothing is what it seems, everything is subject to a (dis)continuous ‘change’. Weick’s
understanding of what an organisation could be, is connected with his conception of the
constructive character of sensemaking. This construction is best described as ‘inner coher-
ence’, an experienced constructed totality which distinguishes itself from the necessary inner
coherence that concerns an essential coherence. It is a totalising, self-validating construction.
After all, there is no ‘underlying reality waiting to be discovered’, therefore it cannot be
normative.
With Weick, we see that through the process of sensemaking, a factual, meaningful,
‘being-such-unity’ is created. That creation of unity or coherence, is the necessary
condition for Sense, meaning.6 There, sense determines the capacity of the experienced
truth, not the ontological truth. Not ‘language’ and ‘being’, but ‘speech act’ and ‘being-
how’ are important in this case. Therein, Weick sees an analogy with reading, which
connects words and sentences into a whole, one text, which retrospectively comes into
being as an inner coherent story in the act of reading. It is potentially there as possible
totality, but only evolves through reading and speaking. The synchronic totality is
present as sense in the diachrony of the act as possibility and as ‘developing’ as well,
but retrospectively it is constructed as unity.
We have named a few important aspects of Weick’s sensemaking process. It is a construc-
tion that in its nature temporarily gives sense, which is established retrospectively. That
temporality derives from the (dis)continuity of the sensemaking-process. We have already
seen that Weick prefers act over thought, since he defines the organisation as ‘organising’. In
his core sentence BHow can I know what I think until I see (hear) what I do?^,7 he repeats this
insight. The act precedes understanding, sense. We also have a first presumption about the
nature of that sense. According to its nature, it is complete. It is impossible to step out of it
except by taking action. The process of sensemaking unfolds again and again and (re)creates
meaning, the understanding of reality and one’s own identity. Reality and identity are fluid
5 ibid. p. 37 and also see Weick’slatest book together with Kathleen M. Sutcliffe (2007), Managing the
Unexpected, where he describes different practical situations where there is being dealt with fear and the
unexpected on an organisational level.
6 See also Van Den Hengel (1982) in The Home of Meaning. (pp. 98). There, he cites Dilthey and agrees with
him. In this essay, like Weick, we use the concepts ‘sense’ and ‘meaning’ synonymously.
7 See, amongst others (Weick 1995: 12; Weick 2001: 463). It is the wording of the sensemaking process, one of
Weick’s core concepts.
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concepts whose meaning changes regularly.8 In the next paragraph, we shall further discuss
sensemaking as a shared mental construction (‘shared meaning’), which is established retro-
spectively, based on shared experience and changes (dis)continuously.
Sharing of Meaning
Weick indicates that there can be numerous reasons to coordinate acts, and that Bshared
meaning is not what is crucial for collective action but it is the experience of the collective
action that is shared^ (1995: 42). He does not aim at the realisation of an identical sense, or to
reach an agreement on a shared experience of reality. ‘Sharing of meaning’ has to be taken
literally as activity, not as a result! The temporary establishment of meanings, the fact that they
are shared in that process and their transformation to a new reality is a form of critical practice.
Only after the sharing, a new ‘reality’ comes into being.9
This common action, these ‘working’ relations, can originate in individual considerations
aimed at realising individual goals. Common goals are therefore not crucial for common
action. The fact that not the individual, but the relationship -the joint behaviour - is the nucleus
of organising, has as a consequence that the attention of the ‘aware individual’ moves to the
‘acting individual’. In other words, all action within the organisation is relevant because it
contributes to common experience, the basis for sensemaking.
Construction of Identity
Identities are (de)constructed in a process of interaction, and the sensemaker redefines himself
continuously in the shift that is triggered by these interactions. The definition of the self is not
(pre)-)given, but on the contrary the result of the out there. It is a dynamic structure of
interpretation that mediates between intra- and interpersonal processes. What underlies these
processes, is the psychological need to lift tensions and oppositions and to come to a ‘sense of
identity’, a general orientation with respect to situations that maintain an appreciation and
consistency of someone’s self-understanding. If that is not affirmed, that tension will give rise
to renewed sensemaking. The basic presumption here is that sensemaking is self-referential,
which means the ‘self ’ and not the ‘environment’ is ‘the text that asks for meaning’.
Sensemaking is a process that constructs identities. Weick underlines that: B(…) sensemaking
matters. A failure in sensemaking is consequential as well as existential. It throws into question
the nature of self and the world (1995: 14)^.
The organisational life of a participant exists in joint actions, interlocked or bound
behaviour, which he constructs into a meaningful life within the organisation. We must realise
that someone does not invest everything in one group, but that he is member of several groups
by way of interlocked behaviour. Members of different groups can prefer alternative actions.
Every participant will have to take these potential alternatives into account. Therefore, there
8 In comparison, we could think about border thinking: where – in principle – irreconcilable discourses meet,
new vocabularies arise, established based on temporary definitions. Think of a debate about climate change in the
chemical industry: economic-financial interests, shareholders, environmental activists, unions, stakeholders etc.
will have to formulate temporary agreements – definitions - in an undecidable future in order to continue with the
organisation. In this essay, we shall not further elaborate on this topic. See also Jozef Keulartz (2005: 21–41).
9 Weick formulates the following seven core aspects of sensemaking, which are also characteristic to his own
thought: Grounded in identity construction, Retrospective, Enactive of sensible environments, Social, Ongoing,
Focused on and by Extracted Cues, Driven by Plausibility rather than accuracy (1995: 17–62).
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will always be an evaluation, a calculation. Consequently, the individual will appear to himself
as principally multiple or ambiguous. Weick is clear about the multiple character of the self.
From the beginning, Weick points out that ‘I’ should not be understood as singular, it is rather
‘a parliament of selves’. Moreover, that multiplicity enables our flexibility and our ability to
adjust. But insofar as that individual multiplicity would be problematic, the individual triesto
unite them in an interpretation of the person, a constructed unity that retrospectively produces
the integrity, the unity of the person.
In an organisation, a person is not valued because of his personality, but because of what he
adds whilst acting, as actor. In this respect, Weick speaks of ‘partial inclusion’:
When there is partial inclusion or interlocking of some behaviours, additional behaviours
of the individual may come under the control of this collective structure, because the
person’s desire to stabilize it (1979: 96).
The collective structure is protected by the individual because it assures him that the
benefits of his connected behaviour will be preserved. Although Weick emphasises the
psychological need for coherence, its collapse is an unavoidable and hence necessary part of
that coherence. Interruptions, suspension of expectations, bring about emotions which incite
‘sensemaking’. The purpose of sensemaking is to stabilise this chaos psychologically, not in
reality but in identity. Weick writes:
It is precisely because ongoing flows are subject to interruption that sensemaking is
infused with feeling. (1995: 45) (…) BThe feeling of order, clarity and rationality is an
important goal of sensemaking, which means that once this feeling is achieved, further
retrospective processing stops (1995: 29).
The need for new meaning arises when the existing has exhausted her meanings, or has
become inefficient or instable because of contradictions. The sensemaking of the event itself is in
crisis here, not the event per se (1995: 176). Such processes, we call ‘organising’, which takes
place constantly andwithin the entire organisation. They are loosely connected, but determinative
for the survival of the organisation. The combination of loose links, the ‘causal loops’, can both
increase effects of small actions, and strengthen the social influence within the interaction itself.
Adaptability, independence and social pressure are, for instance, elements of social
influencing which are determinative for the course of the interaction process. Because this
social dynamics especially plays a part in relatively small organisation-units, Weick deems the
size of the organisation itself of lesser importance for the analysis. For most individuals, it is
only natural that the greater part of the organisation is part of their surroundings.
Enactment
Another important concept that Weick uses is enactment (2001: 176). It is an active and
creative moment in the ‘production process’ of gaining knowledge (doing that produces
knowing). It divides the event (bracketing) and collects all elements which can – as unique
collection – gain significance. In other words, it is an ordering which enables identification of
elements that potentially can gain significance, sense. With this term, Weick refers to the ‘act’
which differentiates the undifferentiated and as a consequence creates the possibility of
understanding. It is not about the finding, but about the creation of meaning. It is focused
on action and operation. Therein, the pragmatism of sensemaking is mirrored. Actions are part
of projects and enactment seems to follow the contours of an ‘ongoing’ project. Subsequently,
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sensemaking becomes subordinate to the continuity of the process, not to the goal, the place of
arrival.10 The activity has primacy over the given, the act of creation over that which is found.
That is why, as Weick will argue, the process of enacted sensemaking is necessarily
retrospective.
Participants in the organisation try to build meaning around what binds them. Their
sensemaking is rich in detailing and a source of order and value. It binds loose observations,
experiences and arguments and classifies them in collections that support action, that coun-
teract or that are irrelevant. The choice to act changes that which one understands. Making a
choice adds value to the information. BWe do not choose an antecedent good, but make
something good by choosing it (1995: 159)^.
Cause Maps
Besides sensemaking as process, we also have to look at the question what exactly sense, the
discretionary totalising moment in the process, means according to Weick. In this respect,
Weick speaks of cause maps. We would like to explain that concept as inner coherence, which
refers to a factual and meaningful being-such-unity. It refers to the meaning of the stream of
events with respect to one’s own identity. The concepts ‘unity’ and ‘totality’ do not mean
‘completeness’ or a coherent and consistent non-contradiction. We have elaborately pointed
out that Weick understands sensemaking and sense as an event which enables (inner) contra-
diction. Even more so: contradiction is necessary in order to enable sensemaking to generate
adaption and evolution. Contradiction and diversity are constitutive characteristics of this
totality and the basis of organisational dynamics.
Weick uses the concept cause maps when he speaks of arranging and creating coher-
ence in information. A cause map is built from existing and new information. The new
information is being Bprocessed by the preceding memories^ (1979: 211). A cause map is
placed over a stream of ambiguous experiences and works self-affirming, it Bcreates the
territories that it inhabits^. It becomes space itself (1979: 140; 250). Cause maps reduce
chaos, ambiguity and make reality containable by imposing a structure to it. Therefore, a
cause map is an invention, a construction, not a discovery that is made in reality.
‘Preceding memories’ are helpful in sensemaking and are its basic structure as it were.
Any preferred perspective can fulfil that role. In retrospect experiences are regarded as
‘inevitable events’ which lead to an already known result. The character of this ‘inevita-
bility’, is, depending on perception, differently constructed.
Meetings as Places of Sensemaking
The ‘I’ fromHow can I know… is the acting and reflecting identity which becomes itself in the
process, which develops itself as identity. To make sense of the situation, we are active in the
situation itself as element of change (2001: 461). We stand in the situation, and whilst acting,
we come to a common experience which – in the suspension, until - brings us to a construction
of a sensible meaning of reality. Therefore, sensemaking has a constructive function towards
‘two sides’, both towards the subject (construction of identity) and towards the object (sense).
10 We can recognize elements out of the algorithm of universal Darwinism: variance, reproduction and selection.
This mechanism has no purpose outside itself otherwise than active survival.
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The emphasis is principally on the becoming character of sense and identity, not on a given
(end)goal. Weick cites Walsh and Ungson’s definition of organisation:
(…) a network of intersubjectively shared meanings that are sustained through the
development and use of a common language and everyday social interaction (1995: 38).
In this formulation, we see that the place of the common does not lie in an identical
meaning, but that it is temporarily retained as it were, perpetuated in the use of language and
the factual cooperation. This is how the cognitive and the social are connected, coincidental
and factual! The social order also comes into being by sharing of meaning, meanings that lean
upon an implicit, shared common history and experience. This ‘incomplete’ consensus about
how certain facts can be conceived, acknowledges the social order. Subsequently, through the
interpretation of this order, patterns of meaning arise as a product of acting. These patterns
exist independently of the interpretations that these patterns have produced.11
Shared meaning is not about an equal, but about a similar sense (1995: 188). The
organisational coherence – shared meaning, common values – is usually described as
organisational culture. Weick, on the contrary, argues that this is hard to accomplish because
all people have different individual experiences. What participants do have in common
however, is that the experience, actions and activities are shared. This shared experience can
retrospectively be conceived as similar (and not equal) meaning. The explication of a shared
experience leads to a common conceptual framework, which is referred to as ‘culture’.
BCulture, is what we have done around here, not what we do around here^.
According to Weick, the organisation is located on the level of ‘sharing’, not on the level of
abstractions. Sensemaking and sharing of sense or sharing of meaning exists due to the acknowl-
edgment of a diversity of possible meanings.12 In organisations, sharing takes place in meetings:
the chaotic meeting of difference (different experiences, opinions and ideas) makes sense and
creates new vocabularies.13 The meeting of arguments, discussing, is the most important and
sensemaking dynamic which makes or breaks an organization. Echoing Schwarzman,Weick says:
Momentarily, at least during the meeting, there appears to be an organization, and this
appearance is reconstituted whenever meetings are constituted. (…) Meetings assemble
and generate minorities and majorities, and in doing so, create the infrastructure that
creates sense. This infrastructure varies in the frequency with which it generates good
arguments, advocacy, and divergent thinking, as well as the spirit of contradiction (1995:
143–144).
Weick’s hermeneutic vision allows contradiction, confrontation and interruption to be part
of the sensemaking-process, just because of their ‘disturbing’ effect. That is why moments of
consultation operate as founding places of sense. In that reality, where there is room for
inconsistency and inconsequence, we suppose the living organisation which we experience on
a daily basis. The opposition between the preservation on the one hand, and the void of sense
11 Precursors of the sensemaking theory are sociologists Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann. In 1966, they wrote
a book about social constructivism The Social Construction of Reality, Garden City, NY, Doubleday.
12 In Art education experiments are going on in shared learning: practicing and thinking together bringing in
different arts (painting, sculpture, movement, ballet, music, etc.). See ‘Looking behind the corner’ (Achter het
hoekje leren kijken) of Isolde Vanhee & Tom Van Imschoot (2015). In Rekto Verso. nr. 68 (p.50). This resembles
the comparison Weick made between an organisation and a jazz improvisation.
13 Verbs (acting) occur more often than nouns (status quo) (1995: 111). Also think of boundary work, the
commons (public-private cooperation), on interfaces where different expertises start working together.
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on the other, is retained in organising and not lifted in favour of the dominance of flexibility or
stability. Weick words it as follows: Bambivalence is the optimal compromise^ (1979: 219).
Although compromises are acceptable, they suppress the adjustment mechanism.
With the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, we can say that Weick also gives an anti-
metaphysical basis to the subject by defining it as Bbeing singular plural^.
Nancy writes:
Being itself is given to us as meaning(Sense). Being does not have meaning(but is a
mental construction). Being itself, the phenomenon of being, is meaning that is, in turn,
its own circulation (an acting and communicative de-sign, a circularity of creation of
meaning which has neither a beginning, nor an end) - and we are (construction of
identity) this circulation. There is no meaning if meaning is not shared, and not because
there would be an ultimate or first signification that all beings have in common, but
because meaning is itself the sharing of being (social). Meaning begins where presence
is not pure presence but where presence comes apart (in the suspension, the ‘until’) in
order to be itself as such (Nancy 2000: 2).
What Nancy says here is that sharing of meaning equals sharing of being. In that sense,
sharing is an event, a complex of acts which generates various meanings.
Meetings are moments of sharing of meaning with people who do not yet share experiences
with others.14
Shared Meanings, Moments in Connected Behaviour
It is often being said that a group imposes norms onto its members. What underlies that
idea is the assumption that there would first be a group that subsequently holds itself
accountable for the rules, values and norms that hold a group together. According to
Weick, we have to turn it around. Firstly, there is an overlap between persons regarding
their values (beliefs), an overlap which appears as connected behaviour that is dominated
by norms. The latter enables sustainable relations to come into being. When multiple
persons meet in the act, there is a possibility that each of them can benefit from it in terms
of satisfaction of needs or self-expression. This is only possible however, if the constant
presence of the other is implied (1979: 90).
Weick builds up the logical train of thought which leads to group formation up as follows:
firstly, in the meeting of activities, an idea comes into being about a convergence of mutual
interest, and then a similar idea about how that can be achieved. Based thereon, a repetitive
double interaction is established, a collective structure. The scope of their behaviour is limited
before the group is formed. In this respect, Weick speaks of a convergence, a de-sign of different
ideas. Participants in a collective structure share space, time and energy but they do not have to
share vision, aspiration, desire or intentions. The latter comes later on, or probably never. The idea
that groups form around shared goals is turned around by Weick, and replaced with the idea that
groups form around shared means. Groups form between people with different goals!(1979: 91)
Therefore, the issue is a diversity of goals and a communality of goods. Only when the
participants converge on joint behaviour, a subtle move sets in from diversity to communality
14 Weick refers to Heidegger in this respect, the being thrown and to Dilthey and his ‘hermeneutic circle’
(1995:44).
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of goals, where diversity is somewhat suppressed. Somewhat, because as we have seen before:
Bambivalence is the optimal compromise^.
(dis)continuity
According to Weick it is incorrect to speak in terms of ‘results’ in relation to sensemaking,
because this ignores the continuity of the process itself. He writes:…‘there is no result of process
but only a moment in process’. Sensemaking is ongoing. One can only understand interruption as
an impulse to sensemaking starting from a sense of what continuity means. To Weick there are
thus two aspects that are mutually involved, pure duration and interruption. He connects pure
duration with Heidegger’s idea of ‘geworfen sein’. Herein lies the unavoidable social character of
human acting: we are physically… somewhere. According to Weick the situation of Dasein as
geworfen sein (being as a historical and empirical existence) und Hinfälligkeit (sensibility,
susceptibility) is best described by way of the metaphor ‘meeting’. We can recognize this
‘geworfensein’ and ‘continuously experience’ as organizational issues. Streams, problems,
solutions, people and choices flow through the organisations and converge and diverge irrespec-
tive of the human intention. Even solutions and problems are easily confused.
When people are interrupted, they react emotionally at first because of the confusion this
interruption causes, only subsequently they can give meaning to this interruption. Moreover,
people constantly generate interventions themselves, through which reality permanently
changes. Following Mead, Weick compares the memories and associations to prior experi-
ences that have permanently changed reality to a ‘parliament of selves’, through which he
relocates the acting person as an agent amidst a continuously changing environment.15
Postmodernist Lyotard takes it even a step further and sees interruption as a rupture,
necessary for the recognition of the deficiency of the other. Through interruption time (and
deficiency) is introduced. Interruption is an act of survival, a postponement of ‘completion’.
Completion is equal to stagnation, to death (Manschot 1995: 235). Lyotard precisely considers
the ethical as interruption. It is the ‘susceptibility to obligation’ that is separated from politics
as ‘the threat of dispute (…) [and] the diversity of purposes (Lyotard 1983: 200 and 249).’ An
interruption triggers a physical defence mechanism that leads to a (functional) (re-)action. This
action as a consequence of an interrupted expectation pattern becomes emotionally charged
and this combination of action and sensation leads to sensemaking, according to Weick.
Foucault describes ‘rupture’ as a critical event after which we will never think, feel or act
the same. The rupture discloses the critical spaces in which reason can be experienced again. In
this way, aspects such as misunderstanding, failure, mistakes, conflict, contradiction and
exclusion play a part in understanding the organisational dynamics. In order to manage the
resulting confusion, individuals actively make sense of that experience retrospectively, in
social interaction. Sensemaking does not cancel diversity, but preserves it as factual and
potential contradictions. This can also work as a disruption giving rise to a crisis. Sensemaking
finds its ground in the unsolved diversity. People want to express their own individuality
against the interdependence of the other group members. This movement does not come to a
halt. In crisis, it is specifically the sensemaking of the event itself which is undergoing a crisis.
15 In 1997, Slawomir Magala wrote an interesting review for Organization Studies, 18/2 on Weick’s
organisational theory, where he concludes that Weick’s treatment of agents as parliaments of selves and the
organisation as a negotiation parlour leads to an anti-(hierarchical) authoritan perspective on the organization
(1997: 333). We think this was an act of clairvoyance of organisational reality in the 21st century.
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Some aspects of the environment have meaning, while others do not. This can give rise to a
‘contrast-effect’ in the organisation: ambiguity. If an existing, collective structure does not
provide stability and order in a dynamic world, the people in this organisation will start
behaving more individually. In this new stage of development, Weick’s pragmatically and
incompletely formed common purposes can disintegrate again into ‘diverse means’, or the
connected behaviour can be broken. The latter situation can arise in the case of division of
labour, reorganisation or specialisation. People find a new (sub) unit with its own creation of
meaning. Therein, the sense of the bigger picture loses its meaning. We especially see this with
experts who are less inclined than others to share with other people. If an organisation does not
have a stable common purpose and the shared meaning of sense keeps disintegrating, then the
emphasis on shared norms and values of an organisation is equally problematic. The meaning
that brings unity is based on a diversity that inevitably keeps manifesting itself as such. In
Weicks view, contradiction, confrontation and interruption are part of the continuous
sensemaking process, exactly because of their ‘disruptive’ effect (Weick 2001: 100–124).
Retrospection and Time
One of the highly criticised aspects of Weick’s theory concerns the retrospective nature of
sensemaking departing from ‘action precedes thought’, a fundamental position.
A crucial property of sensemaking is that human situations are progressively clarified,
but this clarification often works in reverse. It is less often the case that an outcome
fulfils some prior definition of the situation, and more often the case that an outcome
develops that prior definition (1995: 11).
The retrospective nature of sensemaking revolves around the analysis of ‘meaningful lived
experience’ and the fact that the ‘perceived world is in reality a past world’ (1995: 24). Weick
clarifies this by pointing out that ‘time exists in two distinct forms, as pure duration and as
discrete segments’. The first form can be described as ‘a stream of experience’, where
experience is explicitly written in singular (1995: 25). In other words: by placing the
experiences within the continuity (pure duration) they become experience. It is, as Weick calls
it, ‘lived experience, they know what they are doing only after they have done it’. The
observation, seeing or feeling, renders time discontinuous and makes experience into a past
experience, ‘seeing that something is done’. Seeingmakes doing into done and, ultimately, into
sense, so that we can say that sense exists only as past. That is why he can speak of the present
influencing the past. Of course not in the sense that causal relations are turned around, as some
critics claim, but we are only aware of what we have done and not of what we are doing. He
formulates it even more sharply citing Pirsig, who states:
(…) an intellectually conceived object is always in the past and therefore unreal. Reality
is always the moment of vision before intellectualization takes place. There is no other
reality (1995: 24).
In hindsight, experiences are seen as an inevitable sequence of events that lead to an already
known result. The past is reconstructed from the knowledge of the outcome. This means that
the memory serves the result and that we do not remember events, but that - given the result -
we remember the events that have led to this result.
Critics separate past and future, each as a separate meaningful reality. According to them,
retrospective sensemaking gives meaning to the past, while prospection gives meaning to the
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future, the realm of possibilities. In our opinion, the heart of the misunderstanding lies in this
notion. For this criticism does not take into account the notion that the nature of sensemaking
is heuristic, that is to say that meaning is the result of sharing of meaning and refers to total
cohesion. Retrospection relates to the matter of sensemaking, the performed act. However, the
result of this sensemaking process exceeds this act by placing it in relation to other acts, events,
timeframes, etc. It is this cohesion that produces sense, as words refer to the language in its
entirety. In this respect Weick states:
(… ) If sensemaking were not retrospective, we would be forever incapable of making
sense of our past—whether real or imagined. And if sensemaking were not also
prospective, we would be forever at a loss when asked where we want to go (1995: 28).
The sense that thus appears, refers to a totality that generates its own past, present and
future. It is the future of this constructed and signified reality. The sense of the event makes the
sense of its future possible. Weick keeps emphasising that it is not the discovery of the meaning
of the experience that is important, it is not an interpretation of a text. On the contrary,
according to Weick it is the kind of attention given to this experience that determines meaning.
In this sense, prejudice plays a part, and this is important because reflection is ‘over-deter-
mined’ and multiplication creates meaning. The dimension of the possible does not refer to
what is indefinitely logically possible, but to what is definitely actually possible, which results
from the reality that is construed by the sensemaking process.
Weick’s opinion that we do not interpret the act but our relation to that act, suggests he
would support such an analysis. He writes:
… the idea that sensemaking is self-referential suggest that self, rather than the envi-
ronment, may be the text in need for interpretation.… I make sense of whatever happens
around me by asking, what implications do these events have for who I will be? What
the situation will have meant to me is dictated by the identity I adopt in dealing with it.
And that choice, in turn, is affected by what I think is occurring. What the situation
means is defined by who I become while dealing with it or what and who I represent
(1995: 24).
The notions of continuity and discontinuity are located on the side of the sensemaker
himself and illuminate because of changes in perspective. BMeaning is not ‘attached to’ the
experience that is singled out. Instead, the meaning is the kind of attention that is directed to
this experience (1995: 26)^.
Derrida helps us to better understand Weick’s notion concerning the retrospective
nature of sensemaking. According to Derrida, the abovementioned misunderstanding is
the result from holding on to the idea that past and future arise from the now, while it is the
other way around: past and future are the conditions for a potential now. It is her original
supplement. In the now, we are no longer originally and completely within ourselves. The
now is the transition between a no longer and a not yet. It is a bursting apart of presence
that withdraws itself and postpones indefinitely. This space of ‘non-presence’, of not being
identical to oneself, is the space where meaning is ascribed. In his aforementioned key
phraseHow can I know what I think until I see (hear) what I do? Weick calls this ‘until’.
The present is present to itself only afterwards. The ascribing of meaning redeems the lack
of presence, there is a desire for presence (Derrida 1967: 207–208).
Critics also direct their objections to the alleged ‘reverse of causality’, which means that
‘sense’ and ‘act’would be reversed in time. That thought can only arise if causality is conceived
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as a logical succession of acts, sense being the cause of the action that preceded in time. But it is
incorrect to conceive sense and action in this way. After all, it is about the reflection on this
experience which is in no way determined or univocal. This reflection can never be seen as a
causal relation. Sense does not exist in a causal but in a judgmental relation towards the
experience, in which values and priorities lead to unambiguity in an over-determined reality.
Plausibility
As we have already seen, sense is shared during meetings (sharing of meaning). In this respect,
Weick speaks of a condensing of sense as a shared reality, without being able to speak of an identical
understanding of that reality. This gives rise to the question of the basis of such a condensing, which
is merely temporary and incomplete. A reference to an out there that could be standardising therein
is not possible. Aswe have indicated before, theworld does not present itself to us as a fixed fact, but
the basis for our knowing should be sought in its ‘groundlessness’. According to Weick,
sensemaking is about plausibility, pragmatics, coherence, reasonability, creation, invention and
instrumentality. It is not and cannot be dependent on an accurate reproduction of a perceived
‘reality’. Sensemaking has a merely relative relation to truth. B… people will believe what can
account for sensory experience but what is also interesting, attractive, emotionally appealing, and
goal relevant (1995: 57).^ Sense is socially acceptable and credible. All possible truth is practical.
Beliefs that counteract interruptions and facilitate ongoing projects are treated as
accurate. Accuracy, in other words, is project specific and pragmatic. Judgments of
accuracy lie in the path of the action (1995: 59).
This caution drives him to choose the thinking of psychologist and philosopher William
James above Derrida’s deconstructive thinking (Weick 1995: 38). James’ famous question ‘is
life worth living?’ followed by the answer ‘yes’, is the beginning of the theory of sensemaking
and enactment. With his statement ‘faith is instrumental to sensemaking’, Weick gives away his
preference for James. The finding that there is no stable and uniform external world, but that our
own interpretations and judgements shape the world, presupposes a trust in a ‘self-fulfilling’
mechanism which guarantees the creation of an organisational reality based on interpretations.
At different times, Weick speaks of the causal relations ‘which are irreversible’. By this he
means that this relation is arbitrary in the sense that it trades its primary causal relation for a
relationship or cohesion. Here he merely refers to an external cohesion, and not to a conceptual
one. That is also why, in his later work, he does not speak of cause maps anymore, but connects
the sensemaking to stories: inductive generalisation. Instead of indicating the primacy of the
argumentative two-dimensionally in the cause map, he later places the primacy in the narrative,
the plausibility, the conviction, which is not necessarily (merely) justified causally and accurately.
If accuracy is nice but not necessary in sensemaking, then what is necessary? The
answer is, something that preserves plausibility and coherence, something that is
reasonable and memorable, something that embodies past experience and expectations,
something that resonates with other people, something that can be constructed retro-
spectively but also can be used prospectively, something that captures both feeling and
thought, something that allows for embellishment to fit current oddities, something that
is fun to construct. In short, what is necessary in sensemaking is a good story (1995: 60).
The story is a form of description which ‘transforms events into historical facts by
demonstrating their ability to function as elements of completed stories’. It is fiction, but ‘no
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more fictional than any other product such as thought since abstraction, schematization, and
inference are part of any cognitive act (1995: 128)’. Stories can generate meaning, especially
because they too are built sequentially.16 A story keeps unlike things together, long enough to
generate energy and to give direction to action, which is plausible enough to retrospectively
make sense of what happens, and binding enough so others will also want to contribute in
favour of the survival of this binding.
Implications for Management
Based on the foregoing we can at least make the following observations:
– The smallest unit of analysis of the organisation is not the individual but a (action-)
relation that does not condense itself to ‘a group’ but to ‘shared experience’.
– This relation is practical, it is in fact bounded behaviour and thus cannot be understood as
a relation between participants.
– Because this action-relation is the basis, an organisation is primarily an activity and not a
static whole, a verb instead of a noun.
– The organisation is in principle ‘without ground’ and sensemaking is the basis for the
understanding of the organisation and its environment.
– Sense is based on an appreciative judgement of shared experience.
– The core of organising is ‘sharing of meaning’ which condenses itself through (narrative)
language usage.
– Sensemaking is also identity-constructing.
Weick has given us a theory about organisations which emphasises the action and not the
planning, in which continuity is rooted in discontinuity, stability in successive crises and the
cohesion does not lie in community of purpose, but in a diversity of purposes of participants
and in the common practical experience of working together. Incoherence and inconsistency
have become aspects of the conception of organisation and are therefore no longer an external
threat. The boundaries of Weick’s organisation and therewith the conception ‘environment’ are
diffuse and indefinite. Everything technicians from the 19th century have passed on to us
seems to have crumbled, including calculative thinking itself. Weick makes it possible for us to
make sense of our modern world.
‘Sharing of meaning’, the exchange of meaning and values, is central. In this respect we
agree with Nancy, who formulates it as follows:
There is no meaning if meaning is not shared, and not because there would be an
ultimate or first signification that all beings have in common, but because meaning is
itself the sharing of being (Nancy 2000: 2).
16 Magala refers in this respect to Paul de Man. His position has been summarised by John Phillips as follows:
‘The grounds of literary meaning (and by extension all meaning) must be located in rhetoric rather than in any of
the other possible dimensions (form, content, reference, grammar, logic etc.). But a rhetorical reading cannot
guarantee authority over interpretations. Therefore there is no authority that can guarantee a reading. This doesn’t
license us to read a text just anyway we want to. Rather it commits us to readings that take full account of the
possibilities and limits of reading (and writing) generally. One name for these possibilities and limits might be
deconstruction (https://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/deman.htm)
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Managing becomes the managing of sense, sharing of meaning, of diversity and opposi-
tions. A manager who sets himself as an example and tries to push through one dominant
sense, denies the necessity of diversity and undermines the organisational dynamics itself.
If we take this conception of organisation as a point of departure, we cannot get around the
question which consequences this dynamical conception of organisation has for the theory and
practice of organising today, and for thinking about management and leadership. If the nucleus
of ‘organising’ is the bounded behaviour and not the individual, and if its existence is rooted in
the sharing of meaning, then the individual - or individual leadership - can no longer be at the
heart of our research. We must then focus on the dynamics of organising itself. Leadership
presents itself as a stimulator towards sharing of meaning, which can transform ‘the way it is’
into ‘the way it could be’. Leadership represents the escape fromwhat seems incomprehensible,
chaotic and indifferent to us. It takes us through living language from aworld we cannot control.
Within this context however, leadership can no longer be seen as a personal quality, it is a
movement that legitimises itself only afterwards (Wesseling and Langenberg 2013: 185–201).
Of course there are also consequences for other fields of practice and research, such as
organisational ethics. We will have to verify how the consequences of Weick’s conception of
organisation relate to diversity in values and norms. To what extent do values and norms
depend on sensemaking and sharing of meaning? Are we generally inclined to see the context
as a contribution to the evaluation of behaviour? Weick makes it impossible to see sense as (a)
sense giving totalising context(s). Again and again we will have to construct these shared
norms and values, rooted in shared meaning of experience in action and in dialogue. We can
probably only find a basis for postmodern and multicultural organisational ethics, if we are
able to push through this diversity of values and norms which correspond with a diversity of
meanings,
The above-described concept of leadership is also relevant for moral leadership. This is
often merely conceived as exemplary behaviour of a manager, but within this framework it is
rather the creation of a reality of responsibility and the managing of sharing of meaning. Would
it not be logical to further study this aspect within the sensemaking process and especially
within the ‘sharing of meaning’? How can the management of integrity be defined when it is
mainly about the management of diversity? What should we think about (management)
training that aims at developing moral conscience, mainly by resolving pre-structured cases,
and does not look at the real process, i.e. sensemaking itself? How should we regard tests of
individual integrity and other psychometric instruments in this respect?
Weick agrees with Walsh and Ungson (1991), who describe the organisation as Ba network
of intersubjectively shared meanings that are sustained through the development and use of
common language and everyday social interaction (1995: 38–39)^. In this case, should we not
focus more on the role of language, the stories and the rhetoric within organisations?
Finally, it comes down to the fact that the people who come together at a certain
moment for a negotiation, a conversation, a strategic, political, national or international
meeting, open up their judgement to the other. In the evolution of organisation we
constantly discern a preference for calculative thinking. This has a twofold effect:big
companies, national government, universities and large financial institutes lose credibility
and are no longer the figurehead of (economic) stability and progress. Secondly, the effect
on society is unmistakeably visible in the growing inequality and in the discontentment
involved. Calculative thinking does not take sensemaking into account. It does not
understand crises as a crisis of calculative thinking itself, of its attempt to merge the
multidimensionality of language with the one dimensionality of calculation.
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‘Organising’ as described by Weick, goes way beyond one single idea of a classical
organisation. Dynamics makes sure that ‘theorder’ of society repositions itself constantly
about and within the organisation. Sharing of meaning and sensemaking do not happen solely
within the walls of the organisation, but are inside all of us and happen everywhere. This
becomes most visible in public-private collaborations, where the management of, the working
in and the enjoyment of property is a common act and is determined by the constant sharing of
meaning ánd being.
Modern, global society consists of arbitrary fluid (temporary) networks. The porous
separation between the private and the public fades, which constantly evokes and strengthens
discussions on boundaries. An organisation is the prototype thereof, where a proliferating
diversity both pushes back and oversteps boundaries and demands new boundaries. This
fundamental movement, which does not stop, must be understood if we are to manage it. In
our opinion Weick can assist us in that understanding.
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